from the rest of the world. Since Bob Gregory's work has focused almost exclusively on the Australian economy, I view the paper as an examination of the validity of a country-specific "Gregorian" approach to economic research.
I. Learning from Model Species Economies
Almost everything we know about the fundamental properties of living cells -how they grow and divide, how they express their genetic information, and how they use and store information -has come from the study of model organisms. -Fields and Johnston, 2005 Most biologists spend their scientific lives studying particular speciesslugs, bacteria, flies, yeast, squid, zebra fish, mustard plants, mice, etc -known as model species or organisms. Biologists dedicate themselves to a particular species not because they have a weird fetish for that creature but because that species provides exceptional insight into some fundamental biological issue.
Mendel's peas opened the door to the genetics of inheritance that no other organism might have done. The fruit fly allowed Morgan and others to locate mutations on genes and to examine how mutations affect phenotypes and recently for Bender to illuminate the genetics of behaviour. The giant axon of the squid Loligo pealei makes it a model for studies of nerve functions. The transparent body of the zebra fish allows scientists to see the operation of its internal organs.
Mice are a model for diseases that affect humans because mice have an immunological system and contract some human diseases. And so on. i. Attributes of a Model Biologists highlight four factors in determining whether a species becomes a model organism, studied by hundreds or thousands of researchers around the world, or lives a life of quiet obscurity 2 : 1) the tractability of researching the species, which depends on accessibility, the ease of experimenting on it and the cost of maintaining it with extant laboratory technology; 3 2) the presence of some distinct feature(s) that allows researchers to make outstanding/speedy progress in a significant line of inquiry; 3) the potential for generalizing findings to other creatures, particularly to humans; 4 4) the cumulated knowledge about the species, which creates (in our lingo) economies of scale or agglomeration effects in research. 5 The parallel in economics for experimental tractability is the availability of reliable data on economic behaviour. When Simon Kuznets developed national income accounts in the 1920s, the critical data need was for reliable statistics on sales and income to show how the aggregate economy was performing. Today the data go far beyond national accounts and measures of economic aggregates to include diverse micro data on individuals and firms, such as: longitudinal information on employees or employers; matched employeremployee files over time; time budget studies; data on patents and R&D; measures of individual health and biological markers linked to wages, employment, and other outcomes; measures of workplace practices and productivity; and so on. The French and Scandinavians have been particularly good in developing matched longitudinal employee-employer data files (Abowd and Kramarz, 1999) . The Scandinavians have good data relating biological measures, such as birth weight, to future outcomes. The UK has exceptional data on labour practices at workplaces in the form of the Workplace Employment Relation Surveys.
Ready availability of the standard labour force or firm survey data files that countries use to measure the state of an economy is also important. Nearly every country conducts censuses and surveys of businesses and residents. But most limit access to these data. A model economy should ideally provide downloadable data over the Internet, so that researchers around the world can study its workings. The University of Minnesota PUMS project that makes US Census files freely available on the Internet and the US Bureau of the Census's provision of Current Population Survey files to researchers (most easily downloadable from NBER) have sparked work on the US using those particular sources of information.
For its part, Australia has an excellent body of statistics for analysis of the labour market, ranging from cross-section surveys to longitudinal surveys (Le and Miller, 1998; Marks and Rothman, 2003) , including a unique longitudinal survey of immigrants (Cobb-Clark, 2001 ), workplace surveys (Hawke and Wooden, 1997) , time use surveys, regular Censuses (Flatau, 1997) , input output tables (Gretton, 2005) , the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey (Watson and Wooden, 2004) California showed that Enron had manipulated the market and produced guilty pleas from the market traders. 7 Statistical analyses would never have uncovered the illegal manipulation behind the California crisis. While this is an extreme case, the statements by participants in other decisions also cast light on competing explanations that neither theory nor econometrics can match. In the labour area, the statements by ACTU and national union leaders provide critical insight into why the Australian union movement endorsed a decentralized wage-setting system in 1990-91 (Briggs, 2001, pp. 33-34) . One of the few advantages that social science has over the natural sciences in research is that we can interrogate the decision-makers about whom we build our models, which should help us assess competing explanations or theories. Without controlled lab experiments to 8 nail things down, we have to use whatever information we can get. Just as a model organism requires some special feature that gives it a leg up in discovery, a model economy must experience some special exogenous or near exogenous variation in economic conditions that allows researchers to draw stronger or more reliable inferences from it than from some other economy. The variation could be a change in policy -a sudden alteration in tariffs, imposition of new labour laws, development of an independent central bank; rapid expansion of the supply of schooling; etc; -that creates incentives for people to alter behaviour. It could be a shock from outside, such as changes in the prices of exports or imports due to factors overseas, an energy shortage per the California crisis, a large demographic shift. It could even be an epidemic that kills much of a population, which T.W. Schultz (1983) suggested was an ideal test for the claim that traditional agricultural societies have labour surpluses with zero marginal product of labour. What is important is that the change be sufficiently big that reactions to it dominate other factors impacting an economy over some period of time.
The availability of experimental or pseudo-experimental measures of outcomes before/ after policy initiatives can also provide insight into economic behaviour beyond responses to the specific initiative. Researchers in economic development have studied the economics of education in Columbia and Indonesia because those countries have varied investments in schooling in experimental or pseudo-experimental ways and have made the data available to researchers (Duflo, 2002; Angrist, Bettinger, Kremer, 2004) . The hope is that the findings from these countries can be generalized to others, and thus help guide their investments in schooling. Since we can conduct random assignment experiments even in countries that lack good data in other domains, low wage countries have a cost advantage in experimenting with economic incentives where the results are likely to generalize to other economies. Extant studies show similarity in responses in experiments across country lines (Kagel and Roth, 1995) .
Finally, the social science parallel to the fourth point listed above for a model species -a cumulated body of knowledge about the creature -is the strength of a country's research community. A research community with knowledge about how things work can be critical in assessing specific reforms, particularly those relating to broad-ranging institutions and practices. De jure measures of institutions available to outsiders may not accurately represent how a given economy operates (Chor and Freeman, 2005) , leading to potentially invalid interpretations, which a knowledgeable research community can correct.
Availability of data on diverse parts of an economy -national income and flow of funds accounts, measures of trade and investment -is also critical, as it allows researchers to check the representativeness of samples and plausibility of statistics in particular areas.
In sum, any economy that combines good information with natural experimental variation or random assignment experiments in practices/policies is a viable candidate for model economy in those areas. At the minimum, we will learn something about how the particular factors operate in one setting, which can be compared to how they operate in other economies. At the maximum, we can learn something about behaviour or markets that generalize from that economy to other economies which we could not learn elsewhere.
II. Generalizing When Ceteris Is Not Paribus
The degree to which results can be generalized from a model system is more problematic in economics than in biology. In biology, cellular processes operate similarly across living creatures, in part because they obey universal scientific laws and in part because they have the same evolutionary heritage. 8 We share 96% of our DNA sequence with chimpanzees, according to the latest estimates 9 , are closely related to worms and flies, and dingos and kangaroos, for that matter. But generalizations across specie lines are easier at the molecular and gene level than at the level of complete organisms. Doctors often test medicines on mice or monkeys first, but they invariably do human trials to see if the medicine works on humans.
Using the biology analogy, the responses of individuals to incentives would seem to be comparable to cellular processes, while the interactions of people in organizations or markets as well as the general equilibrium interactions in entire economies would be closer to whole organisms. This suggests that phenomenon where the independent responses of people are critical-say demand responses to price incentives -would generalize better across economies than phenomenon involving interactions among groups, such as the institutional design of markets. From this perspective, estimates of demand and supply elasticities should be more comparable across countries than, say, estimates of the effects of unions on outcomes.
Population and output per capita should also affect generalizability. But even when economies have similar levels of complexity, generalizing from one to another can be problematic to the extent that institutions or practices affect outcomes interactively. When institutions/practices affect outcomes without interactions, linear regressions identify their impact on outcomes. But if the effect of an institution depends on the presence/absence of others, so that the configuration of practices matters, the situation is more complex (Ragin, 1987) .
In this case, a country may have to transform many institutions and practices to match the performance of a model economy, 11 per the big bang transition from communism to capitalism that has not worked well for most ex-Soviet states.
Because the number of configurations rises rapidly with the number of institutions/practices, moreover, it is difficult to determine what works or does not work from the limited number of observations we have on particular economies.
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To deal with this problem, analysts seeking to learn from cross-country comparisons often group economies into families with similar institutional features. The advanced English-speaking economies provide one natural grouping, with their strong market orientation and English common law tradition (Freeman, Boxall, Haynes, forthcoming 2006) . Within that grouping, it is presumably easier to generalize between Australia and New Zealand, or between Canada and the US, than from either of those groups to the United Kingdom or
Ireland. The Scandinavian countries form another grouping over which generalizations would seem to have primae facie validity. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane, and Shleifer (2003) have proposed that the legal tradition of countries offers a useful means to group them. The logic of seeking generalizations in closely related settings suggests examining practices or policies within a given country as the first step in moving from the specific to the general.
If something works in New South Wales but not in Melbourne, it would not be sensible to make broad claims about that policy or institution. A federalist structure, which naturally produces regional variation, increases the potential for an economy to be a model for others.
Another way to approach the configuration problem is to assume that the diverse institutions reflect some underlying latent factor, such as reliance on markets to allocate resources, that can be summarized in a thermometer style scale. The Fraser Institute's economic freedom index takes this approach, as does the Heritage Foundation's competing index. Australia rates fairly high as a "free market" economy on these measures, which suggests that it is more valid to generalize from Australia to the market-oriented economies, which include the 13 major English-speaking economies, than to economies further from the free market end of the scale.
Finally, the potentially most devastating limitation on generalizing from one economy to another occurs when history matters greatly in the way individuals or institutions respond to particular incentives. Since every country has its own unique history, strong path or historical dependence limits generalizations from other countries. In this case, even copying the institutions and practices of a model economy need not give the same outcomes. It is critical in comparative analysis to delimit the domains of issues where history matters heavily and where it does no, if we are to generalize from model economies.
i. Unintended Side Effects
Decision-makers want to know what works in another economy or business in order to transplant successful policies or practices to their own. But their concerns often go beyond the generalizability to the potential that a successful transplant will have possible unintended consequences. To take an extreme case, the main concern that the Chinese government has with freedom of association for workers is not the economic effects of unionism on the labour market, which might reduce inequalities and help channel social discontent in ways consistent with economic goals, but that independent unions could lead to a Solidarnosc-style union movement that would bring about democratic reforms. In a more limited area, when the US was assessing possible reforms in the labour relations system in the mid 1990s, the Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, William Gould IV argued against EU style works council as follows: partial transplantation (of labour practices) from a different system is a dangerous thing ... (and we) should tread warily about adopting fully systems which have been devised in the context of other legal frameworks and cultures, [for fear that a works council] would create difficulties for our system of exclusive bargaining representation status. 13 Business and labour groups were also opposed to this innovation. Business feared that works councils would lead workers to form unions. Unions feared that councils would substitute for unions. Both felt that it was better to avoid reforms if they risked unintended effects on their interests.
Faced with a similar situation, the UK made a different decision. For years, the British Trade Union Congress had opposed works councils as an institution devised in countries whose tradition of industrial relations differed from that of the voluntaristic UK. In the 1990s, the TUC changed its views and endorsed European Works Councils and pressured the Labour government to accede to the EU Social Charter, including mandated works councils. The TUC also favoured the introduction of a voting procedure to resolve disputes over representation at work places -a transplant from the US. Management opposition to these changes was muted.
The difference between the US and UK response to the potential transplant of works councils reflects differing views about the extent to which the foreign institution would fit with existing institutions or catalyze other changes in the labour relations system. With large numbers of workers seeking but unable to gain union representation through the exclusive representation bargaining system in the US, and with firms unable to offer non-union mechanisms of voice due to section 8(a)2 of the Labor Management Relations Act outlawing "company unions", the introduction of works councils threatened to change radically the US's legalist labour relations system. In the voluntarist and less contentious labour relations scene in the UK, neither management nor unions saw works councils as particularly threatening.
Generalizing from these and related cases, it would seem that two factors determine how an economy will respond to a transplanted institution: 1) the nature of the potential change -whether it could be catalytic to other institutions or practices; and 2) the status of the recipient economy -its malleability to reforms, or stability. A policy/practice that is catalytic could have a huge impact on a rigid institutional structure but only have a modest impact on a stable or malleable system. A policy/practice that is not catalytic would have no impact on a rigid system and be readily absorbed in malleable economy.
III. Australia as Model Economy
There are (at least) three areas in which Australia has made unique innovations in policy/practice and had distinctive economic experiences which could yield findings that generalize to other economies. These areas are: labour relations; use of market mechanisms to deliver public services in higher education and employment services; and economic growth through immigration and natural resources.
i. Labour Relations 'Australia needs a workplace system geared to the future, not to the past' -John Howard, 2005 When I first learned that Australia and New Zealand used an awards system to determine wages, I had the same kind of reaction that early settlers must have had on seeing the platypus or emu -utter disbelief. Markets are supposed to set wages, not judges on industrial tribunal court proceedings. In fact, judges aside, the Australian (and NZ) systems of awards are in the same family of institutional wage-setting as European mandatory extension systems of determining pay. These systems guarantee that the bulk of the work force is covered by collective bargaining, regardless of the proportion unionized. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in the US, Canada, Japan, or the UK, among others, where there is a near one to one relation between the proportion of By extending institutionally determined wages to much of the work force, awards or extension systems invariably lower the dispersion of wage. From one perspective, they accomplish what the Invisible Hand has seemingly failed to do in the job market: establish a single price for a given type of labour. From another perspective, they compress wages excessively, reducing incentives and employment. The Australian awards system appears to be an important determinant of the effect of other economic policies outcomes. It is the main reason why equal pay legislation was more effective in increasing the pay of women relative to men in Australia than in the US (Gregory 1999; Gregory and Daly, 1991; Borland, 1999) . To the extent that the various Australian Accords in the 1980s succeeded, moreover, they did so because the wage-setting system covered the bulk of the work force. As Table 1 shows, union density and pay setting by awards and collective bargaining also fell in Australia. But the proportion of workers covered by institutional wage arrangements remained much higher than membership, at least through 2004. Many Australian firms and workers preferred the status quo of collective contracts and awards to the alternative of individual AWA mode of pay setting that the 1996 legislation introduced. As a result, Table 2 Are the proposed changes as radical as they appear? The government and its opponents agree that the answer is yes. A comparable change in corporate law might be to privilege privately owned firms over publicly owned corporations by removing the limited liability protection given to shareholders, and to reduce consumer protection legislation for products made by small private firms. The changes go beyond anything that conservative governments in the UK or US have proposed. The changes are also remarkable in that government has proposed them in a period when the Australian labour market and economy are functioning well, with low unemployment and rapid accelerated productivity growth (Parham, 2004) . It is not the Winter of Discontent in 1980s Great Britain, nor the US air traffic controllers striking illegally against the Federal Government in 1981.
Given the weakened state of unions, the new legislation could be the nail in the coffin of collective labour arrangements in Australia, with potential reverberations for other countries. Or it could prove that legislatively attacking the collective rights of workers creates greater political and economic turmoil than could justify such a policy. In either case, the new legislation is the sort of "natural experiment" that will make Australia the model economy for assessing collectivism in the labour market. What more could one ask for to assess how labour codes affect labour relations and labour market performance than an unnecessary extreme change in labour law? A new Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey perhaps to help assess the change.
ii. Market Mechanisms for Public Services
In 1989 Australia developed the world's first income contingent mode of funding much of higher education -the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) (Chapman (2001) . The HECS has many features that fit with the predilections of economists. It differentiates prices by field, gives students the option for paying fees up-front; offers a more equitable way of funding student education than taxing citizens to pay for the education of the future elite; is less risky for students than loans; and gives greater autonomy to universities. The government's partial deregulation of the higher education system allows universities to determine the student contribution amount within the specified ranges.
Shifting the cost of higher education from the state to students has helped Australia to increase university enrollments while reducing state funding of higher education relative to GDP (Marginson, 2001, table 1) . In addition, the market orientation of Australian universities has led them to become world leaders in selling undergraduate education to the citizens of other countries, further increasing their revenues. There is no evidence that the HECS has discouraged low income students from going to universities or reduced the overall rate of university attendance. While the system has problems -student-faculty ratios have risen and faculty earnings have fallen relative to other groups, raising issues about quality -Chapman's assessment is that the income contingent charge for higher education has worked. No one has made a cogent case rejecting this assessment. Given the seeming virtues of the system, the interesting question is why other countries have not copied the Australian model. If detailed data on the system were readily available on a web site, including university by university records and surveys of students, analysts in other countries would download the information and perform the types of studies that would fit their country's concerns, and thus spread this innovation.
It is not only in provision of higher education that Australia has been a world leader in marketizing government-funded services. In most countries, the state aids unemployed job seekers through assistance in job finding, training, and other active labour market policies. Until recently, some European countries restricted private employment agencies so that the state had an effective monopoly in many employment services. In 1998 Australia chose a different route. It privatized or outsourced employment services to non-profit and profitseeking agencies, as well as to competing public agencies -'a radical transformation of employment service delivery ...without parallel in OECD countries' (OECD, 2001, p 15) . By opening the market for employment services to competitive bids, with the bulk of payments based on a fixed fee for successful placement of the unemployed, the Australian policy potentially unleashed the forces of competition on what had been an administrative function of the government. The result was a large drop in the cost of employment services, with no apparent loss in the quality of services (Shergold, 2002) , which impressed the OECD in its review of Australian labour market policies (OECD, 2001 ).
However, the program has yet to receive the scrutiny of the microeconomic evaluation research community, with specified counter factuals to assess outcomes (Dawkins, 2002) and detailed studies of particular programs. As a result independent researchers have taken a more skeptical view (Webster and Harding, 2001; Oslington, 2005) than the OECD, withholding judgment until data from providers of services are open to public scrutiny. Webster and Harding note that the public sector had higher labour productivity than the private sector in placing workers under the predecessor Working Nation program (Webster and Harding, p 240), which raises questions about what underlies the cost savings of the new program.
To make a scientific case for the Australian model of market-driven government funded employment services requires two detailed research investigations. The first needed research is random assignment experiments comparing the effectiveness of different services (Webster, 1998; Burtless, 2002) .
Since Australia changed the entire system, with multiple service providers offering different services in different ways, a random assignment study of the full change is impossible. Still, the government and agencies can undertake analyses of some services, which would enable them to decide what is working and what is not, and thus improve the system. The second area where research could greatly illuminate the Australian model is in the newly developing market for contracting out employment services. The outsourcing of public employment through a market mechanism offers a unique opportunity to examine the organizations that enter and exit the market, the quality of services provided by different government, private and community agencies, and the way in which these organizations respond to winning or losing contracts. The results from such a study could generalize to other markets where governments are considering outsourcing provision of public goods.
iii. Growing Oz: Immigration and Natural Resources As a "settler economy" Australia has grown through immigration and the application of modern technology to extract natural resources and to the development of agriculture. Since not all settler economies have been economic successes -Argentina is often viewed as Australia's errant twin economy in this respect --and since natural resources have proven to be as much of a curse as a boon to an economy (Sachs and Warner, 1999; Ross, 1999 immigrants that help determine aggregate effects (Junankar, Pope and Withers, 1998) . While there is no definitive analysis of the potential scale economies from immigration (OECD, 2003) , evidence that immigrants have had little adverse effects on the wages or employment of natives (Chang, 2004; Addison and Worswick, 2002) , that growth and immigration, particularly of skilled workers, are positively related over time (Pope and Withers, 1995; Nevile, 1990) and the country's policy of selecting immigrants on the basis of labour skills, are consistent with the notion that immigration contributed to growth per capita rather than detracted from it.
Going a step further, Australia's variations in policy for selecting immigrants itself that provides lessons for other countries. Until the early 1970s, the country subsidized passage for Europeans from some countries. Since then Australia has used a point system to encourage immigration of skilled workers (Miller, 1999) Immigrants to Australia provides data that goes beyond standard Census and labour force survey data on immigration to deal with issues of assimilation and career progress (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller, 2005) .
On the natural resources side, Australia has developed economically despite being highly dependent on minerals/fuels and agriculture for the bulk of 
IV. Conclusion: The Advantage of Home Brew
The argument that economics has much to learn from behaviour in "model economies" just as biology learns from model species directs attention at the variation in policies and practices in economies regardless of location. The requirements for a model economy are adequate data; a knowledgeable set of home grown economists; interesting variation in policies/practices; and sufficient similarity to other economies to allow findings to be generalized. In addition, model economies can provide independent tests of models initially fit on other economies, where specification search (Leamer, 1978) risks over fitting the data to match the idiosyncracy of that country's experiences. Because no single economy offers the best variation/instruments for studying more than a few issues, there is space for more model economies than model species.
Australia's unique policies and practices and accessible data make it a model economy for illuminating the critical issues summarized above and potentially others as well. The country's political system seems adept at creating extreme policy experiments that will illuminate economic issues for the foreseeable future, particularly in the direction of greater reliance on markets. As a result, there is a lot the "real world" can learn from Australian experience -as Bob Gregory has done throughout his career. The one thing Australia could do to enhance the economy's status as a model system would be to make Australian data more readily available over the Internet to international researchers. Because interpreting data requires tacit knowledge about an economy -home brew that is easier for residents to imbibe than overseas scholars --Australian economists will almost certainly maintain an edge in analyzing these data. Such provision would more likely raise than lower demand for their services. Imagine, more economists Harbridge, et al (2003) ; May, et al (2003) . 
